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Introductory  Quotes 
“A requirement  that certain taxes should be paid in particular paper money might give that 
paper a certain value even if it was irredeemable.” (Edwin Cannan, Marginal  Summary to 
page 3 12 of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, in Smith  1937: 3 12) 
“[T]he money  of a State is not what is of compulsory  general acceptance,  but what is 
accepted at the public pay offices...” (Knapp 1924: vii) 
“Money is the creation  of the state; it is not true to say that gold is international  currency, 
for international  contracts are never made in terms of gold, but always in terms of some 
national  monetary  unit; there is no important distinction  between notes and metallic 
money.... ” Keynes (Keynes  1983: 402) 
“In an economy  where government  debt is a major asset on the books of the deposit- 
issuing banks, the fact that taxes need to be paid gives value to the money  of the economy. 
The virtue of a balanced budget and a surplus insofar as the commodity  value (purchasing 
power) of money  is concerned  is that the need to pay taxes means that people work and 
produce in order to get that in which taxes can be paid.” (Minsky  1986: 23 1) 
*****k*************X*********************~***********~****** 
Introduction 
In conventional  analysis, money is used to facilitate exchange; its value was long 
determined by the value of the precious metal it represented,  although under a fiat money 
system, its value is determined by the quantity of commodities  it can purchase. This, in 
turn, is a function  of the rate of inflation,  which is presumed to be under the control  of the 
central bank. The government  must tax the public to finance its spending, or, in the case of 
deficit spending, must borrow money  ii-om the public. Such deficit spending raises interest 
rates and crowds-out private spending. Governments  sometimes  “print money”  to finance 
deficits, but this is not likely to increase government purchasing power for it will mainly 
cause prices to rise--and  could even set off an hyperinflation.  Monetary policy  has to do, 
primarily,  with control of the money  supply, while fiscal policy has to do with government 
spending, taxing, and borrowing. 
This is quite different from the Chartalist approach, which  can be traced from 
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Adam Smith through to John Maynard Keynes. Rather than focusing on the better-known 
Chartalists,  in this paper we instead choose to bring out the related ideas of Smith, Knapp, 
and Keynes, and the later ideas of the theorists who follow the “endogenous money 
approach”, as well as related work by Hyman Minsky, Abba Lemer, and Kenneth 
Boulding.  Thus, while this is an exercise in “history of thought”, it is not an exposition  of 
the ideas of those who are narrowly identified  as the Chartalist economists. 
In the Chartalist  approach, money  is a creature of the State; at least in the case of 
modern money,  one cannot conceive  of Stateless money.  The State defines money  as that 
which it accepts at public pay offices (mainly, in payment of taxes). This has important 
policy  implications.  Once the state imposes a tax on its citizens, payable  in a money  over 
which it has a monopoly  of issue, it has no choice but to determine the value of that 
money, by setting the conditions under which the population  can obtain the money.  Taxes 
create a demand for money,  and government  spending provides the supply. The 
government  does not “need” the public’s money  in order to spend; rather, the public  needs 
the government’s money in order to pay taxes. This means that the government  can “buy” 
whatever is for sale in terms of its money merely by providing  its money. It also means 
that the government  can determine the “terms” on which the public obtains the money 
required to pay taxes; it determines what the public must do to “earn” government- 
provided money.  Because the public will normally  wish to hold some extra money, the 
government  will normally  have to spend more than it taxes; in other words, the normal 
requirement  is for a government  deficit. Government  deficits do not require  “borrowing” 
by the government  (bond sales), rather, the government  provides bonds to allow the public 
to hold interest-bearing  alternatives  to non-interest-bearing  government  money.  This 
stands conventional  analysis  on its head: fiscal policy is the primary  determinant  of the 
quantity  of money  issued, and of the value of money, while monetary policy primarily  has 
to do with maintaining  positive  interest rates through bond sales. This also means that 
rather than  “crowding out” private  spending by raising interest rates, government  deficits 
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would normally  place downward pressure on interest rates that is alleviated  through  bond 
sales--which  are not required to “finance” deficits, but are required to prevent  excess 
reserves from driving overnight  inter-bank  lending rates toward zero. Thus, the Chartalist 
view of money,  if fully understood, would lead to a much different view of appropriate 
monetary  and fiscal policy  goals. Most notably, it would be recognized  that rather than 
striving for a balanced budget, deficits would be accepted as the “norm”. And rather than 
trying to use monetary  policy to achieve stable prices, monetary  policy  would recognize 
that its role is to establish the short term interest rate, while fiscal policy  would be used to 
stabilize the value of the currency. 
Smith on Monev 
Let us first examine Adam Smith’s views of money. We will quote liberally  from Smith to 
show how “modern” some of his views appear. At the same time, Smith’s views-- 
particularly  on bank creation of money and on the determination  of the value of an 
inconvertible  currency--are  quite similar to views presented below. It is thus worth the 
effort to explore the arguments of the “father” of economics  in detail; our exposition  later 
might then be easier to follow. 
According  to Smith, convertible  bank notes can substitute for commodity  money: 
“When the people of any particular country have such confidence  in the fortune, 
probity,  and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is always ready 
to pay upon demand such of his promissory  notes as are likely to be at any time 
presented to him; those notes come to have the same currency  as gold and silver 
money...”  (Smith  1937: 277) 
At this point, the bank can “create (bank) money” by lending its own notes: 
“A particular  banker lends among his customers his own promissory  notes.... As 
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those notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same interest 
as if he had lent them so much money....  Though some of those notes are 
continually  coming back upon him for payment, part of them continue to circulate 
for months  and years together.” (Smith  1937: 277) 
Because notes circulate as if they were money, the banker need hold only a fractional 
reserve against them. 
“Though he has generally  in circulation,  therefore,  notes to the extent of a hundred 
thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver may, frequently,  be a 
sufficient provision  for answering occasional  demands. By this operation, 
therefore,  twenty thousand pounds in gold and silver perform  all the functions 
which  a hundred thousand  could otherwise have performed....  the whole 
circulation  may thus be conducted with a fifth part only of the gold and silver 
which would otherwise have been requisite.” (Smith  1937:277) 
Thus, bank notes “free up” gold and silver. As this “freed” gold and silver is not needed 
domestically,  it will leave the country--the paper money  “forces” specie abroad. The 
excess gold and silver will “be sent abroad, in order to seek that profitable  employment 
which it cannot find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a distance  from 
the banks which issue it, and from the country in which payment of it can be exacted by 
law, it will not be received in common payments. Gold and silver, therefore...will  be sent 
abroad, and the channel of home circulation will remain filled with...paper...”  (Smith 
1937:278) At “home”, the force of law ensures the paper money  fulfills  obligations,  but 
this law cannot apply abroad, thus, paper circulates domestically  while  specie is used 
internationally.  For example, in Scotland at the time, the vast majority  of the circulation 
was accomplished  on the basis of paper. “The business of the country is almost entirely 
carried on by means of the paper of those different banking  companies, with which 
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purchases and payments  of all kinds are commonly  made.” (Smith  1937:281) 
In most countries, bank notes enter the economy  as banks discount bills of 
exchange.  “It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing money upon 
them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and bankers  issue their promissory 
notes.” (Smith  1937:282) However, in Scotland, banks had gone one step further, 
inventing  a new method of increasing  note issue. 
“They invented, therefore,  another method of issuing their promissory  notes; by 
granting, what they called, cash accounts, that is by giving  credit to the extent of a 
certain sum....to any individual  who could procure two persons  of undoubted 
credit and good landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever  money 
should be advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been given, 
should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest. Credits of this kind 
are, I believe, commonly  granted by banks and bankers in all different parts of the 
world.” (Smith  1937:282-3) 
In other words, banks issued notes and held IOUs of borrowers, with the “surety” of two 
creditworthy  persons. These banks would then accept their notes in payment  of bank 
loans. This then increased the demand for bank notes in order to make payments  on loans 
(“cash accounts”). 
“The banks, when their customers apply to them for money,  generally  advance it to 
them in their own promissory  notes. These the merchants  pay away to the 
manufacturers  for goods, the manufacturers  to the farmers for materials  and 
provisions,  the farmers to their landlords  for rent, the landlords repay them to the 
merchants for the conveniencies  and luxuries with which they supply them, and the 
merchants  again return them to the banks in order to balance their cash accounts, 
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or to replace what they may have borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole 
money business of the country is transacted by means of them.” (Smith  1937:283) 
Not only does the “paper money” substitute for gold and silver money,  it actually 
increases the volume  of trade. “By means of those cash accounts every merchant  can, 
without  imprudence,  carry on a greater trade than he otherwise  could do.” (Smith 
1937:283) This is because the merchant  with a “cash account” (or, credit line) can safely 
keep nearly zero precautionary  balances.  “The merchant in Edinburgh. ..keeps no money 
unemployed  for answering such occasional  demands. When they actually come upon him, 
he satisfies them from his cash account with the bank, and gradually replaces the sum 
borrowed with money  or paper which comes in from the occasional  sales of his goods.” 
(Smith  1937:284) This does not mean that the volume of paper money  will exceed the 
volume  of gold and silver that would be necessary to circulate the same output. If it were 
to exceed what is necessary  for circulation,  it would reflux to the banks (for redemption), 
resulting  in a drain of gold and silver reserves. “Should the circulating  paper at any time 
exceed that sum, as the excess could neither be sent abroad nor be employed  in the 
circulation  of the country, it must immediately  return upon the banks to be exchanged  for 
gold and silver.” (Smith  1937:284) 
Occasionally,  however, banks do issue too much paper money.  This could occur 
because a bank did not actually require its loans to be repaid; for example, a bank might 
allow a customer to deliver a bill of exchange rather than either commodity  money  or bank 
notes. Further, these were often “fictitious” bills with no commodities  circulating  behind 
them. 
“Though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced, were all of them re- 
paid in their turn as soon as they became due; yet the value which had been really 
advanced upon the first bill, was never really returned to the banks which advanced 
7 it; because, before each bill became due, another bill was always drawn to 
somewhat a greater amount than the bill which was soon to be paid; and the 
discounting  of this other bill was essentially  necessary towards the payment  of that 
which was soon to be due. This payment,  therefore,  was altogether  fictitious.” 
(Smith  1937:295-6) 
The problem was that this process would increase interest owed (due to compounded 
discounts on the bills submitted for payment) beyond the ability to pay. Further, excessive 
note issue would increase reflux, draining reserves. The bank would find that it actually 
had to increase its reserve holdings--which  earn less interest--lowering  its profitability. 
Thus, for the most part, market pressures would ensure that there would be a tendency  to 
issue the “correct” amount of paper--which  would be equivalent  to the quantity  of gold 
and silver required for circulation--but  more than the amount that would have been 
circulated if specie were a~  used in circulation  (because the volume  of trade would 
be larger). 
According to Smith, market pressures are most likely to work if the denomination 
of notes is regulated. If banks are permitted to issue small denomination  notes, then 
unscrupulous  bankers will take advantage of unsophisticated  consumers--issuing  notes 
they cannot redeem. This is possible because for small denominations,  little effort is 
devoted to determining  the financial  strength of the issuer; furthermore,  small 
denomination  notes tend to take a circuitous route (from employer  to worker to retailer  to 
intermediary)  before redemption--meaning  they might stay in circulation  a long time, 
tempting  the banker to increase issue. On the other hand, large notes circulate mainly 
among more sophisticated  “dealers” (merchants), are redeemed more frequently,  and more 
effort is taken to determine  creditworthiness  of issuer. Smith thus recommends  that “It 
were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in any part of the kingdom  for a 
smaller sum than five pounds. Paper money would then, probably,  confine itself, in every 
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part of the kingdom,  to the circulation  between the different  dealers....” (Smith  1937:307) 
So long as paper money  is redeemed on demand for gold (or silver), it circulates  at 
par with the gold coin. “A paper money  consisting in bank notes, issued by people  of 
undoubted  credit, payable upon demand without any condition,  and in fact always readily 
paid as soon as presented, is, in every respect, equal in value to gold and silver money.... 
Whatever  is either bought or sold for such paper, must necessarily  be bought or sold as 
cheap as it could have been for gold and silver.” (Smith  1937:308) If it is not redeemable 
on demand, then it may circulate at a discount. He discussed the case where redeemability 
might be uncertain,  or might require a wait: “Such a paper money would, no doubt, fall 
more or less below the value of gold and silver, according as the difficulty  or uncertainty 
of obtaining  immediate  payment  was supposed to be greater or less; or according  to the 
greater or less distance of time at which payment was exigible.” (Smith  1937:309) He 
went on to give the example of banks in Scotland which adopted an “optional  clause” 
which allowed them the option of withholding  redemption  for six months  after 
presentation  (in which case they paid interest for the period). These notes typically 
suffered a discount  of 4% relative to specie in trade. 
As another example, Smith offered the case of the American  colonies, which 
typically  offered conversion  only after a wait of several years and did not pay interest on 
the paper for the waiting period. Still, these colonies passed legal tender laws “to render 
their paper of equal value with gold and silver, by enacting penalties  against all those who 
made any difference  in the price of their goods when they sold them for a colony  paper, 
and when they  sold them for gold and silver...” (Smith  1937:3 11) Smith decried such 
regulations  as “tyrannical” and ineffectual,  for the colony currency would fall relative to 
the English pound. However, he also noted that Pennsylvania  “was always more moderate 
in its emissions  of paper money than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency 
accordingly  is said to never to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which was 
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current in the colony  before the first emission of paper money.”  (Smith  1937:3 I 1) Here 
there is some ambiguity,  for he had not previously  argued that the depreciation  of a 
nonconvertible  currency was a function of the ~,UU&J of the currency  issued, but now he 
seemed to argue that the more moderate  emission of Pennsylvania  might forestall 
depreciation. 
However, in the following  paragraph he seems to have solved the puzzle. If a 
paper money whose redeemability  is uncertain  (or is subject to conditions--such  as a 
waiting period) is accepted in pavment of taxes, and if it is not excessively  issued relative 
to the tax liability,  then it need not depreciate relative  to specie. 
“The paper of each colony being received in the payment  of the provincial  taxes, 
for the full value for which it had been issued, it necessarily  derived from this use 
some additional  value, over and above what it would have had, from the real or 
supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and redemption.  This additional 
value was greater or less, according  as the quantity  of paper issued was more or 
less above  h  1  1  of the particular  1 
colony which issued it. It was in all the colonies very much above what could be 
employed  in this manner.” (Smith  1937:312) [emphasis added] 
Thus, the depreciation  noticed in the colonies  occurred precisely  because the note issue 
was well above what was required in payment  of taxes. 
A wiser government  could not only prevent depreciation,  it might even cause paper money 
to carry a premium  over specie! 
“A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion  of his taxes should be paid in 
a paper money  of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain value to this paper 
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money;  even though the term of its final discharge and redemption  should depend 
altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank which issued this paper was 
careful to keep the quantity of it always somewhat below what could easily be 
employed  in this manner, the demand for it might be such as to make it even bear a 
premium,  or sell for somewhat more in the market than the quantity  of gold or 
silver currency for which it was issued.” (Smith 1937:3 12) 
In summary, an essentially non-redeemable paper money could actually  circulate 
above par even under a gold standard if it was legally required by the state in payment  of 
taxes, and 5 the quantity issued were kept “somewhat below what could easily be 
employed  in this manner”. The key, then, is not really redeemability,  nor is it “legal tender 
laws” that attempt to “render their paper of equal value with gold and silver”; rather, it is 
the acceptance  of the paper money  in payment  of taxes and the restriction  of the issue in 
relation  to the total tax liability  that p’  _Ivesy.  Importantly,  Smith 
recognized  that this paper money  need not be government  fiat currency, for his argument 
was predicated upon the recognition  that the paper money  is the liability  of the banking 
system, issued as the banks “made loans” and accepted private IOUs. All that mattered 
was that the state accepted these bank notes in payment  of taxes, in which case they could 
circulate at par, or even at a Premium, relative to specie. 
In the next section, we will examine Knapp’s more general theory  of money,  which 
is consistent with, but expands significantly  upon, the observations  of Smith. 
Knapp and the State Theory  of Money 
Georg Friedrich  Knapp put forward a &&  theory of money,  similar to, but more general 
than, what is now known  as the Chartalist  approach. This approach is opposed to the 
Metallist view, according to which the value of money  derives from the value of the metal 
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standard (eg, gold or silver) adopted. More generally,  according to Knapp, Metallists  try 
to “deduce” the monetary  system “without the idea of a State”. This, he believes,  is 
“absurd” for “the money  of a state” is that which is “accepted at the public pay offices”. 
(Knapp  1924: vii-viii)  It is thus impossible to separate the theory  of money  from the 
theory  of the state. Knapp’s exposition  is quite complex and required the creation  of a 
classificatory  scheme with hundreds of terms. We will try to keep our summary quite 
simple; to some extent we will have to paraphrase rather than use extensive  quotes for 
otherwise  we would have to define the numerous terms he created. 
Knapp noted that his approach was shaped by the view that “the use of paper 
money was based on credit”. (Knapp 1924:vi) As such, he was concerned  initially  with 
debts, means of payment,  and units of value. The means of payment was defined as “a 
movable thing which has the legal property of being the bearer of units of value” (Knapp 
1924:7), while the “unit of value is nothing but the unit in which the amount of the 
payment  is expressed” (Knapp  1924:8). Debts are expressed in units of value and 
discharged with means of payment. What, then, determines which things will act as means 
of payment  to discharge debts? Knapp noticed that means of payment  are occasionally 
changed;  sometimes one type of material (say, weighed or coined gold) has been accepted 
but “suddenly” another (say, weighed or coined silver) takes its place. Therefore,  while the 
means of payment  may be a definite material, it is not bound to any particular  material  for 
it may be changed. (Knapp  1924: 8-25) “A proclamation  is made that a piece of such and 
such a description  shall be valid as so many units of value.” (Knapp 1924:30) “Validity by 
proclamation  is not bound to any material.  It can occur with the most precious  or the 
basest metals, and in all cases where payments  are not pensatoty  [that is, where the value 
of the money material is not calculated by weighing  it], i.e. in all modern monetary 
systems.” (Knapp  1924:30) The fundamental  insight was his recognition  that these 
transitions  always require that the State announce  a conversion  (say, so many  ounces 
of gold for so many ounces of silver). This proves that the debts were always nominal and 
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were never actually  “metallic”: all debts are converted to the new metal, which proves that 
all units of account must be nominal.  Hence, the Chartalist,  and more specifically,  State 
theory  of money,  since the proclamation  is made by the State. 
Knapp examined the transition  from use of weights of gold, to stamped coins that 
are weighed  to determine value, to stamped coins that are accepted at face value,  and 
finally  to paper money;  he found that the State played the major role in much of this 
transformation--but  we shall skip this historical  evolution.  We will begin with the modern 
system, where Chartal money has developed. 
“When we give up our coats in the cloak-room  of a theatre, we receive  a tin disc 
of a given size bearing a sign, perhaps a number. There is nothing more on it, but 
this ticket or mark has legal significance;  it is a proof that I am entitled to demand 
the return of my coat. When we send letters, we affix a stamp or a ticket which 
proves that we have by payment  of postage obtained the right to get the letter 
carried. The “ticket” is then a good expression....for  a movable,  shaped object 
bearing  signs, to which legal ordinance gives a use independent  of its material.  Our 
means of payment,  then, whether coins or warrants, possess the above-named 
qualities:  they are pay-tokens,  or tickets used as means of payment....  Perhaps the 
Latin word ‘Charta’ can bear the sense of ticket or token,  and we can form a new 
but intelligible  adjective--‘Chartal.’ Our means of payment have this token, or 
Chartal, form. Among civilized peoples in our day, payments  can only be made 
with pay-tickets  or Chartal pieces.” (Knapp  1924:31-32) 
Note that like the tin disc issued by the cloakroom,  the material used to manufacture  the 
Chartal pieces is wholly  irrelevant--it  can be gold, silver, or common metal; it can be 
paper. 
“It is, therefore,  impossible to tell from the pieces themselves  whether they are Chartal or 
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not. This is at once evident in the case of warrants. As to coins, we must always refer to 
the Acts and Statutes, which alone can give information....  if the pieces gain their validity 
through proclamation,  they are Chartal. Chartality, then, is simply the use in accordance 
with proclamation  of certain means of payment having a visible  shape.” (Knapp  1924:34- 
35) Finally,  “Money always signifies a Chartal means of payment. Every means of payment 
we call money.  The definition  of money is therefore ‘a Chartal means of payment”‘. (Knapp 
1924:38) 
Knapp’s explanation  may appear to be nothing more than the claim that legal 
tender laws determine that which must be accepted as means of payment,  and as well 
determine the value of the means of payment. However, his analysis went further. 
“The State as guardian of the law declares that the property  of being the means of 
payment  should be inherent in certain stamped pieces as such, and not in the 
material  of the pieces. In this case also juridical  reflection  goes to work and creates 
the concept  of the pay-token  or ticket, not from caprice but because it must 
accommodate  itself to the altered situation. .  .  . The State, not the jurist,  creates it.” 
(Knapp  1924:39) 
“If we have already declared in the beginning that money  is a creation  of law, this 
is not to be interpreted  in the narrower sense that it is a creation  of jurisprudence, 
but in the larger sense that it is a creation of the legislative  activity  of the State, a 
creation of legislative  policy.” (Knapp 1924:40) 
And what is the nature of this “legislative activity” that determines what will be the 
Chartalist money  accepted within the jurisdiction  of the State? 
“What forms part of the monetary  system of the State and what does not? We 
must not make our definition  too narrow. The criterion  cannot be that the money  is 
14 Money  and  Taxes 
issued by the State, for that would exclude kinds of money  which are of the highest 
importance;  I refer to bank-notes:  they are not issued by the State, but they form a 
part of its monetary  system. Nor can legal tender be taken  as the test, for in 
monetary  systems there are very frequently kinds of money which are not legal 
tender... We keep most closely to the facts if we take as our test, that the money  is 
accepted in payments made to the State’s offices. Then all means by which a 
payment  can be made to the State form part of the monetary  system. On this basis 
it is not the issue, but the accentation,  as we call it, which is decisive. State 
acceptation  delimits the monetary  system. By the expression ‘State-acceptation’ is 
to be understood  only the acceptance  at State pay offices where the State is the 
recipient.”  (Knapp  1924:95) 
Thus, it is the decision  of the State to accept at State pay offices,  and not legal tender 
laws, that creates a chartal money. 
According  to Knapp, “centric” payments,  or those involving  the State, are decisive; 
these take the form of either (1) “payments to the State as receiver;  these we call 
enicentric”  or (2) “payments made by the State, these we will call apocentric”.  (Knapp 
1924:96-97) On the other hand payments  between private persons  (“paracentric”)  “are not 
so important  as is generally  supposed, for they mostly,  so to speak, regulate themselves”. 
(Knapp  1924:96) Indeed, the actions of the state play a large role in determining  that 
which will serve as (“paracentric”) means of payment in private transactions. 
“In the monetary  system of a State there must be one kind of money  which is 
definitive,  as opposed to provisional  (convertible) money.  .  .  . Money is definitive  if, 
when payment is made in it, the business is completely  concluded...The  payer is no 
longer under an obligation,  the recipient has no further rights either against the 
payer or against the State, if the State has issued the money.”  (Knapp  1924: 102) 
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“That kind of definitive money which is always kept ready and can be insisted on 
for apocentric  payments  [payments made by the State] .  .  . we call valuta; all other 
kinds of money.. .we call accessory.” (Knapp  1924: 105) 
The definitive,  or valuta, money is that in which the State makes payments,  and that which 
the State insists it will accept at pay offices and provide in payment. 
“In Germany  our gold pieces were valuta, not because they were made of 
gold...but only because the State, when it made a payment,  was ready in the last 
resort to pay in gold pieces, and, if it found it at all inconvenient,  totally  to refuse 
any other means of payment which the recipient might happen to want.” (Knapp 
1924: 107) 
However,  once the State has decided to accept one type of money  as “valuta”, then that 
type will become the “decisive” money used in private transactions. 
“So, if from political  necessity the State announces that henceforth  it will pay in 
State notes, as fountain  of law it must equally allow the State notes to suffice for 
other payments....  The consequence is, in a legal dispute the means of payment 
which the creditor is compelled to accept is always that which the State has put in 
the position  of valuta.. .  . Apart from friendly agreement, all payments  eventually 
have to be made in valuta money.” (Knapp 1924: 110) 
Thus, it is not simply a “legal tender” law that makes State notes acceptable  in 
private transactions,  but it is the fact that the State first decides what it will use or accept 
as money  in its own transactions,  and the fact that this must then be acceptable  as means 
of settlement  of private debts. “The laws do not decide what shall be valuta money,  they 
merely  express a pious hope, for they are powerless against their creator, the State; the 
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State in its payments  decides what is valuta money  and the Law Courts follow  suit.” 
(Knapp  1924: 111) 
As Knapp noted, State money need not be issued by the State, indeed, most State 
money  in the modem  economy is issued by banks--originally  bank notes (but today, bank 
deposits)--as  they  “buy assets”, or make loans. “The bank makes notes and offers them in 
payment  to its customers. Issuing notes is not a special business...but  a special way in 
which the bank endeavours  to make its payments....  It tries to pay in its own notes instead 
of in money  issued by the State, because then with a comparatively  small capital it can 
make greater profits than it otherwise could.” (Knapp  1924: 13  1) Acceptability  of bank 
notes in private transactions  is not (as was commonly  believed)  due to the bank promise  to 
convert these to specie. In other words, bank money  did not derive its value from the gold 
reserves or specie coin, or even valuta money, into which it promised redemption.  “A 
bank-note  is a chartal document, which specifies a sum of valuta money;  and the bank 
issuing it is pledged by law to accept it for a payment  of that amount.” (Knapp  1924: 134) 
Whether bank notes are convertible  or redeemable is irrelevant.  “An inconvertible  bank- 
note, then, is not a nullity,  but has this in common with the convertible  bank-note,  that it is 
a till-warrant  of the bank.” (Knapp  1924: 134) What is important  is that the note  “is a 
private till-warrant  available  for payments to the bank....but  clearly the customers  of the 
bank can use it for payments between themselves,  as they are sure it will be taken at the 
bank. These customers and the bank form, so to speak, a private pay community;  the 
public pay community  is the State.” (Knapp 1924: 134) Within the “private pay 
community”  (or “Giro”), bank money is the primary money used in payments;  however, 
payments  in the “public pay community” require State money--that  which is accepted by 
the State. This can include bank money, but note that generally  delivery  of bank money  to 
the State is not “final” because the State will present it to banks for “redemption”.  Bank 
money when used in the public pay community is not “final, definitive, valuta” money 
unless the State also uses it in its own purchases. Knapp goes further than Smith in his 
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recognition  that banknotes  do not derive their value from the reserves  (whether  gold 01 
government  fiat money) held for conversion,  but rather from their use in the “private pay 
community”  and “public pay community”;  this, in turn, is a function  of “acceptation” at the 
bank and public pay offices. 
What makes bank notes State money ? “Bank-notes are not automatically  money  of 
the State, but they become  so as soon as the State announces that it will receive them in 
epicentric  payments  [payments to the State].” (Knapp  1924: 135) If the State accepts notes 
in payment  to the State, then the bank notes become  “accessory” and the business  of the 
bank is enhanced  “for now everybody  is glad to take its bank-notes  since all inhabitants  of 
the State have occasion to make epicentric payments  (e.g. for taxes).” (Knapp  1924: 137) 
The bank notes then become  “valuta” money  if the State takes the next step and makes 
“apocentric payments  [payments by the State] in bank-notes”.  (Knapp  1924: 138) 
However,  States often required that banks make their notes convertible  to State-issued 
money  “one of the measures by means of which the State assures a superior position  to the 
money which it issues itself’  (Knapp 1924: 140), and thus maintained  bank notes in the 
role of accessory money  (rather than allowing them to become valuta money).  If the State 
accepts bank notes in payment,  but does not make payments  in these bank notes, then the 
notes will be redeemed at banks--leading  to a drain of “reserves” of valuta money  (indeed, 
governments  and central banks used redemption  or threat of redemption  to “discipline” 
banks). 
In times of distress (frequently  during wars that required finance provided  by 
banks), however,  governments  would pass laws ending convertibility,  announce  that the 
State would henceforth  make payments  in terms of the bank notes, and thereby  declare 
that the bank notes were valuta money.  (Knapp 1924: 143) Usually,  this was for one bank 
only--the  bank which became the central bank. “The change from one kind of valuta 
money  to another can only come by the will of the State, valuta meaning  the kind of 
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money  with which the State makes its apocentric payments.”  (Knapp  1924: 194) Through 
action of the State, then, paper money  can become valuta money.  “At first bank-notes  and 
Treasury notes are employed  only as accessory money.  .  .  . The mournful hour arrives when 
the State has to announce that it can no longer pay in the money that was till then valuta 
[say, coined  gold] and that those warrants themselves  are now valuta.” (Knapp  1924: 196) 
This often comes after the bank has purchased government  debt and issued notes that 
promised  conversion;  in times of war or other distress, the government  would  “encourage” 
banks to issue far more notes (to “finance” government  spending) than they could 
conceivably  convert. Thus, suspension of convertibility  served the interests of government 
as well as the bank. 
At this point we have a Chartalist, nonconvertible,  paper money,  as do all modern 
developed  countries.  Of course, this extreme development  came nearly three-quarters  of a 
century  after Knapp’s book was first published  (1905). However, he had recognized  that 
the money  of a State did not derive its value from metal, and indeed, that no metal was 
needed domestically.  He did argue, on the other hand, that “To dispense with specie 
money  altogether  would only be possible for very large federations  of States, [and, 
therefore,  is] probably  impracticable.  On account of foreign trade specie money  is still 
necessary.”  (Knapp 1924:~~) Within a State, however,  specie is not necessary  for “State 
money may be recognised  by the fact that it is accepted in payment  by the State”; as 
Keynes  said (see below), the State not only enforces the dictionary  (legal tender  laws) but 
writes it (decides what is to be accepted as money).  Of course, the type of monetary 
system envisioned  by Knapp is similar to the one adopted shortly thereafter  by the US: a 
“gold standard” without domestic convertibility,  but with a specie reserve to satisfy 
international  purposes. Knapp did not foresee the time when metals could be dropped 
altogether  in favor of foreign currency reserves and flexible exchange rates. 
It can be seen that Knapp’s analysis is consistent with Smiths.  Most paper money 
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(today, mostly  deposits) is privately  issued and derives its value not from a promise of 
redeemability  but rather from State acceptance at pay offices. Knapp goes further,  for he 
argues the State eventually  realizes (usually during a crisis) that it can also make payments 
in that which  it promises to accept at pay offices. Once freed from domestic convertibility 
on a metallic  standard, the State’s spending domestically would not be constrained  by the 
quantity  of the metal available. Abandonment  of the metallic  standard internationally 
would eliminate  metallic  constraints on countries. 
es’s Treatise on Money  K_n  ev 
While Keynes’s General Theory presented the theory of aggregate effective  demand that is 
now identified  as “Keynesian theory”, his earlier Treatise on Monev provided  a more 
detailed treatment  of his monetary  theory.  The first volume  of that work presents 
definitions  of money that will be used in his analysis; a brief examination  of these provides 
insights into the view of money  adopted by Keynes. 
According  to Keynes, the “money of account” is the “primary concept” of a theory 
of money;  the money  of account “comes into existence along with Debts, which are 
contracts  for deferred payment,  and Price-Lists, which are offers of contracts  for sale or 
purchase.” (Keynes  1930:3) In turn, “Money itself, namely that by delivery  of which debt- 
contracts  and price-contracts  are discharged, and in the shape of which a store of General 
Purchasing  Power is h&l,  derives its character from its relationship  to the Money-of- 
Account,  since the debts and prices must first have been expressed in terms of the latter.” 
(Keynes  1930:3) He further clarifies the distinction between money  and the money  of 
account:  “the money-of-account  is the description  or &le and the money  is the thing: which 
answers to the description.”  (Keynes  1930:3-4) 
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Following  Knapp, Keynes argued that the state gets involved  by determining  what 
will serve as the money  of account as well as by dictating what “thing” will be accepted as 
money.  “The State, therefore,  comes in first of all as the authority  of law which  enforces 
the payment  of the thing which corresponds to the name or description  in the contracts. 
But it comes in doubly when, in addition, it claims the right to determine  and declare & 
thing corresponds  to the name, and to vary its declaration  from time to time--when,  that is 
to say, it claims the right to re-edit the dictionary.  This right is claimed by all modern 
states and has been so claimed for some four thousand years at least.” (Keynes  1930:4) 
The “Age of Chartalist  or State Money” had been reached, when the state “claimed the 
right not only to enforce the dictionary  but also to write the dictionary”.  (Keynes  1930:5) 
Let us emphasize that Keynes believed the “age of State money” to have begun “at least” 
four thousand years ago, as such, the “State theory  of money” would certainly  apply to all 
the “modern” economies  even those living under the gold standard last century--even  a 
gold-based  “commodity” money is State money. 
The state can thus declare that debt it issues is money.  Privately  issued debt--such 
as that issued by banks--might  be accepted in settlement of transactions  even if it is not 
declared by the government  to be money;  it can then circulate  “side by side” with  “State 
Money”.  (Keynes  1930:6) However, the state might  “use its chartalist  prerogative  to 
declare that the [bank] debt itself is an acceptable discharge of a liability”.  (Keynes 
1930:6) Bank money  then becomes a “Representative Money”. (Keynes  1930:6) “At the 
cost of not conforming  entirely  with current usage, I propose to include  as State-Money 
not only money which is itself compulsory  legal-tender but also money which the State or 
the Central Bank undertakes  to accept in payments  to itself or to exchange  for compulsory 
legal-tender  money.”  (Keynes  1930:6) In a footnote  to this passage, he goes on: “Knapp 
accepts as “Money”-- rightly  I think--anything  which the State undertakes to accept at its 
pay-offices,  whether  or not it is declared legal-tender between citizens.” (Keynes  1930:6- 
7) Finally,  “State money may take any of three forms: ”  H 
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and Manaped  Monev, the last two being sub-species of Representative  Money”. (Keynes 
1930:7) Commodity  money is then defined as “actual units of a particular  freely- 
obtainable,  non-monopolised  commodity which happens to have been chosen for the 
familiar purposes of money”, or “warehouse warrants for actually  existing units of the 
commodity”.  (Keynes  1930:7) Fiat money is representative money  “which is created and 
issued by the State, but is not convertible  by law into anything  other than itself, and has no 
fixed value in terms of an objective  standard.” (Keynes  1930:7) This is distinguished  from 
managed money,  which  “is similar to Fiat Money, except that the State undertakes  to 
manage the conditions  of its issue in such a way that, by convertiblity  or otherwise, it shall 
have a determinant  value in terms of an objective  standard.” (Keynes  1930:8) 
Managed money is according to Keynes the most generalized  form of money, 
which can “degenerate into Commodity  Money on the one side when the managing 
authority  holds against it a hundred per cent of the objective  standard, so that it is in effect 
a warehouse  warrant,  and into Fiat Money on the other side when it loses its objective 
standard.” (Keynes  1930:8) In other words, a full-bodied--say,  one ounce--gold  coin 
valued at one currency unit would qualify as commodity money, while a paper note which 
is convertible  to gold against which a fractional gold reserve is held would qualify as 
managed money--even  if the conversion  rate is one currency unit per ounce of gold. Thus, 
a gold standard system can be operated as either a commodity  money  or as a managed 
money.  On the other hand, a representative  money  can take the form of either a managed 
money  (a paper note convertible  on demand to gold, or even to a foreign  currency--eg  a 
currency  board system) or a fiat money  (no promise to convert at a fixed exchange  rate to 
precious metals, foreign  exchange, and so on). 
Note that Keynes argued even a gold standard, whether a commodity  money 
system or a managed money  system  operates on the basis of State money.  Under the 
commodity  money  system, the State accepts “commodity” gold in payment  of taxes, 
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levying the tax liability  in the form of gold (for example, one ounce per head), payable  in 
actual gold or “warehouse receipts” for gold. Under the managed money  system, taxes are 
levied in the form of dollars (say, $32 per head), with the value of the ounce of gold 
established  by the State (say, at $32 per ounce); while the conversion  rate is determined  by 
the State, there is no requirement  of one-hundred  percent backing  (money  can be 
converted  w  to gold, but it cannot be converted  in reality if all rights to convert  are 
exercised). Under the commodity money  system, government  can change the tax liability 
by changing the gold levy (eg, from one ounce to two ounces); under the managed money 
system, the State can revalue gold (for example, to $16 per ounce) and keep the tax 
liability  constant (say, at $32), or can keep the dollar value of gold constant  and raise the 
tax liability  (eg, to $64). In either case, the State can always  “rewrite the dictionary”,  for 
example, by adopting  a silver standard and a conversion  rate (one ounce of gold for four 
ounces of silver). 
State money can be held by banks, by the central bank, and by the public.  “The 
State-Money  held by the Central Bank constitutes  its “reserve” against its deposits.  These 
deposits we may term s~ank_~onev.  It is convenient  to assume that all the Central 
Bank-Money  is held by the Member Banks--in so far as it may be held by the public, it 
may be on the same footing  as State-Money  or as Member Bank-Money,  according  to 
circumstances.  This Central Bank-Money  pllrs the State Money held by the Member 
Banks makes up the Reserves of the Member Banks, which they, in turn, hold against their 
Deposits.  These Deposits constitute  the M-y  in the hands of the Public, 
and make up, together with the State-Money  (and Central Bank-Money,  if any) held by 
the Public, the aggregate of Current Monev.” (Keynes  1930:9-10) When the state accepts 
the “member bank-money”  at its pay offices, it becomes “state-money”; any payments  to 
the state will cause member banks to lose “central bank-money”  or “state money held by 
the member banks”--that  is, reserves. 
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As we will explore in more detail below, and as Knapp recognized,  “member bank- 
money” is the primary  “thing” answering to the “description”--money--used  in private 
transactions  (or, within the “private pay community”).  When accepted in payment  of taxes, 
it is also used in the “public pay community”--but  it is not “definitive” or valuta money 
from the perspective  of member banks because they must deliver reserves (mainly  “central 
bank money”) whenever taxes are paid using “member bank money”. 
In summary, with the rise of the modem  state, the money  of account (“the 
description”)  is chosen by the state, which is free to choose that which will qualify  as 
money  (the “thing” that answers to the description).  This goes beyond  legal tender  laws-- 
which establish what can legally  discharge contracts--to include that which the state 
accepts in payment  at its “pay-offices”.  The state is free to choose a system based on 
commodity  money,  fiat money,  or managed money. Even if it chooses a strict commodity 
system, the value of the money  does not derive ti  the commodity  accepted as money, 
“[flor Chartalism begins when the State designates the objective  standard which  shall 
correspond  to the money-of-account”.  (Keynes  1930: 11) “[Mloney  is the measure  of 
value, but to regard it as having value itself is a relic of the view that the value of money  is 
regulated by the value of the substance of which it is made, and is like confusing  a theatre 
ticket with the performance.”  (Keynes  1983:402) Instead, the &@  determines the value of 
the commodity  (eg, an ounce of gold) relative to the money-of-account;  this merely 
establishes the price in terms of money at which the state is willing  to purchase the 
commodity,  or, alternatively,  the quantity of the commodity  it is willing  to provide  upon 
redemption  of state money.  Once it is recognized that the state may  “write the dictionary”, 
it becomes obvious that the value of a commodity  (or managed) money  cannot be derived 
from the value of the “objective standard”; it is then a small step to a “fiat money”  with no 
“objective  standard”, for in all three cases, the state determines the value of money. 
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The Endogenous  Money Approach 
In recent years, many theorists have contributed to the development  of an “endogenous 
money”  approach.  (Davidson  1978, Kaldor  1985, Minsky  1986, Moore  1988, Rousseas 
1986, Wray  1990) There are two fundamental  precepts:  a) the “supply” of money  expands 
to meet the “demand” for money;  and b) the central bank has no direct control  over the 
quantity  of money.  To some extent, all the economists  examined here, as well as most 
economists  until the present century, at least implicitly  adopt an endogenous  money 
approach. It is only in this century that the majority  of economists  have come to accept the 
“exogenous” money view that the central bank can directly  control the quantity  of money 
and that the money  stock can be taken to be “fixed” such that it does not respond  to 
“money demand”; rather, the “exogenous” approach generally  holds that money  demand 
adjusts to the exogenously  given money  supply. In contrast, the endogenous  money 
approach--following  the approach of most nineteenth  century economists  (and, as shown 
above, Smith)--argues  that for the most part, money  supply responds  to “meet the needs 
of trade”, as represented by “money demand”. In this section we only briefly  examine 
contributions  directly related to arguments made above. 
The view that the “supply” of money  expands to meet the “demand” for money  can 
be traced back at least to the Banking  School in the early nineteenth  century  (if not to 
Adam Smith), although this terminology  was not used. (Wray  1990) It was the position  of 
the Banking  School that bank notes are issued to meet the needs of trade (essentially  a 
“real bills” argument), that bank notes could never be excessive so long as they were 
redeemable  on demand, and, thus, that no other restrictions  on note issue would be 
required.  Their contemporary  opponents, the Currency  School, wanted to strictly  regulate 
the quantity  of notes issued so that it would equal the quantity  of coin specie--essentially, 
a 100% reserve backing--to  make the system operate as if all circulation  were conducted 
on the basis of full-bodied  coin (Keynes’s “commodity money”). This, they believed,  would 
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tame or eliminate the business cycle, which they believed to be caused by excessive note 
issue. In contrast, the Banking  School concluded that private bank note issue could never 
be excessive,  so long as notes were convertible,  because they would reflux to banks (a 
position  quite similar to that of Smith, examined above); however, a nonconvertible 
(government)  fiat money  could be excessive because it would not reflux. (Note that 
neither  school appeared to recognize that state fiat money  does indeed reflux as taxes are 
paid--which,  as Smith recognized,  is the mechanism  that can ensure state note issue is not 
excessive.  The Currency  School also did not appear to recognize  Smith’s argument that 
the volume  of trade will be higher if the quantity of notes issued were to exceed the 
quantity  of gold reserves.) 
Others after this controversy  similarly held the view that the supply of credit 
expands more-or-less  in step with the needs of trade. Marx, for example,  argued that 
during an expansionary  phase, credit substitutes for money,  functioning  as the primary 
medium of exchange and allowing the volume of transactions  to rise. In a crisis, however, 
only “narrow money” (Knapp’s “valuta” money) is desired, where it functions primarily  as 
a means of payment  to retire debts (and pay taxes) rather than as a medium  of exchange. 
In crisis, “the circulation  of [bank] notes as a means of purchase is decreasing”  even 
though  “their circulation  as means of payment may increase”. (1909 p. 542) “It is by no 
means the strong demand for loans...which  distinguishes the period of depression  from 
that of prosperity,  but the ease with which this demand is satisfied in periods of prosperity, 
and the difficulties  which it meets after a depression has become a fact” (1909, p. 532). In 
other words, banks readily advance loans (creating “member bank money”)  in expansion 
but refuse to grant credit in the downturn. 
As discussed above, Keynes also recognized that banks normally  can increase 
loans to finance  an increase of spending. (This is even clearer in his 1937 articles, after 
publication  of Thee.  See Keynes  1973.) Many of his followers  later held to 
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similar positions.  This was developed by Kaldor (1985) into what has come to be known 
as the “horizontalist”  endogenous money  approach. (Moore  1988) A similar, but mainly 
independent,  path led to the Circuitiste  approach. Before Keynes,  Schumpeter  had 
developed  a view of dynamic and innovative  banks, in which credit expansion was the key 
to allow entrepreneurs to finance innovation.  Indeed, credit was seen as “essentially  the 
creation  of purchasing  power [by banks] for the purpose of transferring  it to the 
entrepreneur”.  (1934 p. 107) Building  on Schumpeter’s views, the Circuitiste  approach  to 
money  independently  reached many of the same conclusions reached by the Post 
Keynesian  endogenous  money approach. (See Deleplace and Nell  1996) 
What is important  to note is that this means that the “quantity of money”  is not 
“exogenous” in the sense of being determined either through monetary  policy  (such as 
control  over bank reserves) or by the quantity  of a precious metal reserve (as under a 
“commodity money” or “managed money” system). While the state defines money,  it does 
not control  the quantity.  The state is able to control its initial  emission of currency, but this 
is through  fiscal policy  rather than through monetary  policy.  That is, the quantity  of 
currency  created is determined by purchases of the state (including  goods, services, and 
assets purchased by the treasury and the central bank); much of this currency will then be 
removed  from circulation  as taxes are paid. The rest ends up in desired hoards, or flows to 
banks to be accumulated  as bank reserves. Monetary policy then determines how many 
reserves will be drained (or removed from member bank accounts) through bond sales. As 
Boulding  (1950) had argued, fiscal policy has more to do with the quantity  of money 
issued by the government, while monetary policy has to do with regulation  of financial 
markets  (most importantly,  with determination  of short term interest rates). 
Hyman Minsky presented a view of money that was based on the Chartalist 
approach. His views were related to his belief that the fundamental  characteristic  of 
modern capitalism is the need for financing  of positions in assets, including  capital. The 
27 L. Randall  Wray 
approach emphasized the “endogeneity” of money, that is, the view that money  is created 
during the normal,  and important, processes of a capitalist  economy--and  is not created 
and dropped by helicopters.  For the most part, bank money  is created as banks “make 
loans”. 
“Money is unique in that it is created in the act of financing  by a bank and is 
destroyed as the commitments  on debt instruments owned by banks are fulfilled. 
Because money  is created and destroyed in the normal course of business, the 
amount outstanding  is responsive to the demand for financing.  ” (Minsky 
1986:249) 
A “loan” is nothing  more than an agreement by a bank to make payments  “now” on the 
basis of a promise of the “borrower” to “pay later ”  “Loans represent payments  the bank  . 
made for business, households,  and governments  in exchange for their promises to make 
payments  to the bank at some future date.” (Minsky  1986:230) 
All of this occurs on the balance  sheets of banks; the “money” that is created is 
nothing  more than a credit to another bank’s balance  sheet. According  to Minsky,  there is 
a pyramid of liabilities with the liabilities  of the Fed at the top. Bank “money” normally 
expands on demand, depending  on creditworthiness  of borrowers,  as banks accept 
liabilities  and issue their own. Their liabilities are convertible  on demand into Fed 
liabilities, which are used for inter-bank clearing (as well as conversion  of bank liabilities 
to “cash” held by the public, resulting in a net reserve drain). 
“The payments banks make are to other banks, although they simultaneously 
charge the account of the customer. In the receiving  bank, the payments  are 
credited to a depositor’s account. These payments  are from the account  or line of 
credit of some customer at the paying bank and are credited to a particular  account 
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at the receiving  bank.” 
“For member banks of the Federal Reserve System  the interbank payments  lead to 
deposits  shifting  from the account of one bank to the account  of another  at Federal 
Reserve banks. For nonmember banks, another bank--called  a correspondent-- 
intervenes,  so that the transfer at the Federal Reserve banks are for the accounts  of 
correspondents.”  (Minsky  1986:230-l) 
Thus, “payments” among banks occur on the balance  sheet of the Fed; banks use “Fed 
money”  (reserves) to settle net debits from their accounts.  “Whereas the public uses bank 
deposits as money, banks use Federal Reserve deposits as money.  This is the fundamental 
hierarchical  property  of our money and banking system.” (Minsky  1986:23 1) This is, of 
course, the same hierarchical  arrangement noted by Knapp (in his “public and private” pay 
communities)  and by Keynes. 
In an argument very similar to Knapp’s Chartalist view, Minsky explained that 
people accept bank money  in part because they can use it to meet their own commitments 
to banks. 
“In our system payments banks make for customers become deposits, usually  at 
some other banks.... Demand deposits have exchange value because a multitude  of 
debtors to banks have outstanding  debts that call for the payment  of demand 
deposits to banks. These debtors will work and sell goods or financial  instruments 
to get demand deposits. The exchange value of deposits is determined  by the 
demands of debtors for deposits needed to fulfill their commitments.”  (Minsky 
1986:23 1) 
The “borrower” retires his/her promise to the bank by delivering bank liabilities  at the 
future date, and the need for bank liabilities  to retire one’s own liabilities  to banks leads 
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one to accept bank liabilities  in payment  for goods and services delivered. Rather than 
focusing on money as a medium of exchange, this focus is on money as means of payment- 
-to retire liabilities.  One accepts bank money because one has, or might have, liabilities  to 
banks. 
This led Minsky back to the Smith/Knapp recognition  that taxes give value to the 
money  issued by the government. 
“In an economy  where government  debt is a major asset on the books  of the 
deposit-issuing  banks, the fact that taxes need to be paid gives value to the money 
of the economy.. .  . [T]he need to pay taxes means that people work and produce  in 
order to get that in which taxes can be paid.” (Minsky  1986: 23 1) 
Returning to the primary Chartalist theme, Abba Lerner insisted that 
“[Wlhatever may have been the history of gold, at the present time, in a normally 
well-working  economy, money is a creature of the state. Its general acceptability, 
which is its all-important  attribute, stands or falls by its acceptability  by the state.” 
(Lerner  1947:3 13) 
Just how does the State demonstrate  acceptability? 
“The modem  state can make anything  it chooses generally  acceptable  as money. .  .  . 
It is true that a simple declaration  that such and such is money  will not do, even if 
backed by the most convincing  constitutional  evidence of the state’s absolute 
sovereignty.  But if the state is willing to accept the proposed money  in payment  of 
taxes and other obligations  to itself the trick is done. Everyone  who has obligations 
to the state will be willing to accept the pieces of paper with which he can settle 
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the obligations,  and all other people will be willing  to accept these pieces of paper 
because they know that the taxpayers,  etc., will accept them in turn. On the other 
hand if the state should decline to accept some kind of money  in payment  of 
obligations  to itself, it is difficult to believe that it would retain much of its general 
acceptability.”  (Lemer  1947:3 13) 
This seems to be about as clear a statement as one can find: even if it has not always been 
the case, it surely is now true and obvious that the state writes the “description”  of money 
when it denominates  the tax liability  in a money of account, and defines the “thing” that 
“answers to the description” when it decides what will be accepted at public pay offices. 
The “thing” which answers to the “description” is widely  accepted ti  because of legal 
tender laws and ti  because it might have (or have had) gold backing,  but because the 
state has the power to impose and enforce tax liabilities  and because it has the right to 
choose  “that which is necessary to pay taxes” (“twintpt”). This right, as emphasized by 
Keynes,  “has been so claimed for some four thousand years at least”. While Keynes is no 
historian  and while one might quibble over the exact number of years since states first 
claimed these rights, there can be no doubt but that all modern  states do have these rights. 
As Lerner said “Cigarette money  and foreign money  can come into wide use only when 
the normal money  and the economy  in general is in a state of chaos.” (Lemer  1947:3 13) 
One might only add that when the state is in crisis and loses legitimacy,  and in particular 
loses its power to impose and enforce tax liabilities,  “normal money” will be in a “state of 
chaos”, leading,  for example, to use of foreign currencies in private domestic transactions. 
In the Chartalist  approach, the public demands the government’s money because that is the 
form in which taxes are paid. In the modern economy,  it wpears  that taxes are paid using 
bank money,  but analysis of reserve accounting  shows that tax payments  always lead to a 
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reserve drain (that is, reduce central bank liabilities).  Because the public needs the 
government’s money,  the government  is free to determine what the public must do to 
obtain it; this means the public will have to provide goods or services to the government 
to obtain  “that in which taxes are paid”. The government  does not “need” the public’s 
money, which, after all, is nothing but a government  liability.  This means that neither taxes 
nor bonds “finance” government  spending. Enforcement  of the tax liability  gives value to 
money;  without an effective tax collection  system, the value of money would quickly  fall 
toward zero. This indicates  that money  is accepted not due to legal tender laws, but due to 
the authority  of the State to impose and collect taxes. Neither  are bond sales a part of 
“fiscal policy”,  required so that the government might borrow money  in order to spend in 
excess of taxes. Since the public needs and wants government  money,  the government 
does not have to sell bonds to run deficits. Rather, bond sales are designed to “drain 
excess reserves” to provide  an interest-earning  alternative--mainly  to banks, but others 
also like to hold interest-earning  government bonds. The government  could just  as well 
pay interest on bank reserves, in which case bond sales would not be required; deficits 
would lead to rising reserves, placing  downward pressure on interest rates, but these could 
not fall (much) below the rate paid on reserves. Bond sales are a part of monetary  policy, 
which  exogenously  determines the short-term (or overnight)  interest rate, but this could 
just  as well be determined  exogenously  by setting an interest rate on excess reserves. 
The Chartalist approach makes it clear that conventional  analysis is mostly 
confused. While hyperinflations  are attributed to government  “printing too much money”, 
they are really  due to collapse of the tax authority; while conventional  analysis  blames 
government  deficits for high interest rates, it is true only in a superficial  sense: monetary 
policy  sets the interest rate target and then bonds are sold to drain reserves to hit that 
target. Monetary  policy  could set the interest rate target lower, and would then find (all 
else equal) that fewer bonds would need to be sold to hit the target. While  conventional 
analysis worries that the government  might try to sell bonds to run a deficit only to find no 
buyers, Chartalist analysis  shows that government  can always buy that which is for sale in 
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terms of the domestic currency; if it ever found no buyers for its bonds, this would merely 
indicate that the public prefers to hold non-interest-earning  currency over interest-paying 
government  bonds--surely  nothing for the government to lose any sleep over. Finally, 
while deficits m  be too large (or too small), and while deficits &I increase the quantity  of 
money, this does 114 mean that deficits necessarilv reduce the value of money.  So long as 
government  imposes a sufficiently  large tax liability  and requires sufficient  effort to obtain 
“that which is necessary to pay taxes” (twintpt), deficit spending need not “cause 
inflation”. 
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